<< Annex III | Main report >>
The term "Safety culture" was first introduced after the Chernobyl accident by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG). Experts from Finland were involved in drafting the report of Safety culture (INSAG-4, 1991), and it was possible to develop the national regulations on this topic concurrently.
The nuclear legislation in Finland was totally renewed in late 1980's. The revised Nuclear Energy Act (1987) and Nuclear Energy Decree (1988) include i.a. the basic safety prerequisites, the licensing procedures and requirements for nuclear waste management. Safety culture was formally included in the Finnish nuclear safety regulations in the Decision of the Council of State on the "General Regulations for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants", valid since 1st of March 1991. According to Section 4 of the Decision:
"When designing, constructing and operating a nuclear power plant an advanced safety culture shall be maintained which is based on the safety oriented attitude of the topmost management of the organisations in question and on motivation of the personnel for responsible work. This presupposes well organised working conditions and an open working atmosphere as well as the encouragement of alertness and initiative in order to detect and eliminate factors which endanger safety."
The essential cornerstones of nuclear safety culture in Finland are the commitment of the Government, the Regulatory Organisation, and the Users of Nuclear Energy (utilities).
Safety culture cannot be established in an atmosphere of uncertainty. Therefore the Government has to ensure a predictable and smooth evolution of the national nuclear energy programme. In Finland this has been achieved by:
The regulatory organisations are often seen as "watch dogs" that control their "customers" on behalf of the general public. This is certainly one of their roles, but an important duty of the regulator is to support and foster the good safety performance and safety culture of the Users. In the work of the regulatory body ( STUK) it is strongly emphasised that the Users of Nuclear Energy bear full responsibility for safety, and that true respect should be given to their views and proposals. Also, STUK strives to develop and maintain an exemplary safety culture in its own organisation. This aim is realised e.g. in the following principles of the quality system:
An ultimate responsibility for safety and a strive for excellence, rather than the fulfilment of written rules, should be reflected in all arrangements of the User organisation. Following this line the Users in Finland have a steady investment programme with the aim to keep the plant status and operation at least at the level of the first start-up, and to improve reliability and safety. The Users have mainly set their own performance standards for activities they find most important to reliable and safe operation. The investments made in the training of the personnel have been at a high level and cultural aspects have been covered beside technical and operational themes.
The detection and removal of safety problems can only be done in an open atmosphere where all technical problems and human errors can be reported without a fear of negative consequences to individuals or the User organisation in general. Continuous attention requires the question, how to maintain the spirit of private initiative and the sense of personal responsibility beyond the statutory tasks of each individual among the Users' staff. An observation from the Finnish Users is that all arrangements fostering professional pride among the individual workers are important contributors to addressing this issue.
Practical work for the systematic introduction and fostering of safety culture was started immediately after the Council of State had issued the new safety regulations in early 1991. Training was organised to all engineering and supervisory staff of both power plants as well as to the personnel of the regulatory body, with the experts of STUK giving the lectures.
After the Decision of the Council of the State on the "General Regulations for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants" had entered into force, STUK made an assessment on how it was received at the operating nuclear power plants. A Safety Evaluation Memorandum on the safety culture at the Loviisa nuclear power plant was issued on May 3, 1991, and a corresponding memorandum on the situation at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was issued on January 14, 1992. These memorandums discussed 13 concrete topics of safety culture.
An evaluation of the level of safety culture of the licensees was included in the renewal of operating licenses in 1998. The evaluation was based on the licensees' reports on their safety culture and also on STUK's observations in this area. In conclusion, a safety culture complying with the provisions of section 4 of the Decision of the Council of State of 1991 (cited above) was maintained by both licensees.
The essential characteristics of a good safety culture have gradually been incorporated in the Finnish regulatory guide system (YVL Guides). Especially guides concerning Quality Assurance, Operating Experience Feedback and the Qualification of Plant Personnel provide requirements related to a good safety culture. It is foreseen that during the process of updating the YVL guide system, the issue will be further addressed and emphasised to provide more practical guidance.
Safety culture has also been an essential topic in STUK's continuous interaction with the power plants. The top level inspection of the periodic inspection programme, called "Safety Management", includes an assessment of safety culture issues and quality management. In addition, STUK has emphasised that the strengths and shortcomings of safety culture are determined in quality assurance audits and root cause and other event analyses. Findings related to safety culture from different inspections, audits and event analyses are analysed in STUK and discussed in a yearly meeting between the senior managers of the nuclear power plant and the regulatory body. STUK in 1999 increased the resources allocated for this task by founding a new organisational unit, called "Human and organisational factors", in the Department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Presently, STUK is explicating the goals and actions relating to safety culture into a coherent national safety culture policy.
STUK has striven to develop and maintain an exemplary safety culture and to concretise the concept in everyday action. In the 80's and early 90's this aim was related to the development of quality manuals. After the most recent organisational change in spring 1997, the systematic development of a uniform quality system was started. Today, the quality manuals of STUK and specifically those of the Department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation document both managerial guidance and memory of the organisation by describing the operational practices that are experienced as good and recommendable. A good quality manual
As a means for the further development of operation and safety culture, STUK has initiated several internal audits, self-assessments and independent assessments of its activities. The management system and work processes have been internally assessed with criteria of Quality Award twice (1996 and 2001). The methods used in event analysis were externally evaluated in 1999. The general coverage, consistency and prescriptivity of the regulatory guide system (YVL Guides) were studied in 2001 (see Annex I of the report). Experiences and opinions related to regulatory practices were collected in systematic interviews during 1998. A full-scope IRRT mission was conducted by the IAEA in March 2000. Questionnaires concerning job satisfaction and management practices are used regularly. Lately, the safety culture as a whole has been the subject of conscious assessment and development within the scope of a study carried out within the FINNUS research programme (2000; see below). As a result of these projects, development projects have been introduced some of which have already been implemented.
Experience has shown that a safety culture can not be implemented in a separate action or only by written instructions. The roots of safety culture are in the national culture and in the values of organisations and individuals. Evidence of a strong safety culture should be visible in the daily activities of the plant and it's supporting organisations. In the following, a few examples of topics are mentioned, which manifest safety cultural elements at the Finnish nuclear power plants.
The Finnish Research Programme on Nuclear Power Plant Safety FINNUS (1999-2002) aims to enhance the safe operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants The programme consists of research areas including ageing, accidents, and risks. Research related to human and organisational factors within FINNUS is called WOPS (Working practices and safety culture in nuclear power plant operation). The co-ordination group of WOPS represents relevant safety critical organisations and researchers in Finland, as well as the utilities and STUK, in order to strengthen the exchange of information. The research work is conducted by the Technical Research Centre of Finland, VTT.
Since 1999, VTT has been developing a methodology for characterising, assessing and developing organisational culture in safety critical organisations. When used together with an integrated conceptual modelling of the task and analysis of actual performance, safety culture can be described. A case study was conducted at STUK in 1999. The analysis consisted of a document analysis, interviews, a survey and a workshop for the whole staff of a department. A further assessment of the used method was carried out after the case study was concluded.
The results of the case study indicated a strong need for the clear understanding of one's own tasks in relation to the whole and a need for communication and feedback at both individual and organisational level. The perceived future threats were related to bureaucratisation and a loss of meaning felt in one's work. The regulatory culture is composed of three occasionally conflicting roles, the authority role, the expert role and the public role. The roles set conflicting demands to both the organisation and individuals, such as flexibility and creativity versus control and rigid obedience to rules. The employees of STUK valued professional knowledge, openness, courage, fairness, efficiency, a questioning attitude, teamwork and independence. The results and conclusions of the case study were broadly considered in discussions organised within the Department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and developmental actions were carried out.
The organisational culture research methodology, although still under development and discussion, is considered suitable for use by both regulatory agencies and nuclear power plants. For further development of the methodology, a new case study is underway (2001-2002), focusing on maintenance at Finnish nuclear power plants. In addition to national projects, there has been international co-operation as part of Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS), in which a safety culture interview study was conducted at Finnish and Swedish power plants. The results of the 1999 study were presented at a NKS-seminar.
<< Annex III | Main report >>